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ABSTRACT Serious games can be used to push consumers of common-pool resources toward socially
responsible consumption patterns. However, gamified interactions can result in privacy leaks and potential
misuses of player-provided data. In the Smart Grid ecosystem, a smart metering framework providing some
basic cryptographic primitives can enable the implementation of serious games in a privacy-friendly manner.
This paper presents a smart metering architecture in which the users have access to their own high-frequency
data and can use them as the input data to a multi-party secure protocol. Authenticity and correctness of
the data are guaranteed by the usage of a public blockchain. The framework enables a gaming platform to
administer a set of team game activities aimed at promoting a more sustainable usage of energy and water.
We discuss and assess the performance of a protocol based on Shamir secret sharing scheme, which enables
the members of the teams to calculate their overall consumption and to compare it with those of other teams
without disclosing individual energy usage data. Additionally, the protocol impedes that the game platform
learns the meter readings of the players (either individual or aggregated) and their challenge objectives.
INDEX TERMS Smart grids, gamification, serious games, privacy, water conservation, energy conservation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game-based approaches aimed at stimulating, increas-
ing, or modifying users’ activities have recently attracted
increasing interest. Such approaches can be categorized as
serious games or gamified interactions. The former class
includes games meant for a purpose different than pure enter-
tainment [1]. It therefore denotes the case of game experi-
ences aimed at stimulating and engaging the user. Serious
games have been successfully included in educational and
teaching activities [2] and for health care scopes such as
rehabilitation [3], or to raise awareness about critical issues
in resource and demand side management [4]–[6]. A subcat-
egory of serious games, the so called persuasive games [7],
are specifically designed with the scope of changing people’s
attitudes and behaviors in a desirable direction (e.g. towards a
more sustainable lifestyle, or to increase votes for a political
party). Such games include e.g. advertising games, health-
related games and social/political advocacy games.
Differently, gamified interactions incorporate ‘‘the use
of game design elements in non-game contexts’’ [8]. Like
persuasive games, they typically have a persuasive goal,
e.g. encouraging a more sustainable usage of water [9] or
energy [10] resources, or stimulating drivers to adopt specific
expedients to avoid queues of traffic [11].
The empirical evidence of the effectiveness of these game-
based approaches has been demonstrated in several stud-
ies [12]–[15], which have highlighted that one of the main
reasons for their successfulness is the tendency of people
towards positive imitation. As a representative case study,
the authors of [16] consider the occupants of a block of
flats and show that exposing users to the comparison of
their individual energy consumption to that of their neighbors
impacts positively on their attitude towards energy conserva-
tion. Similarly, in smart power grids, utilities may incorporate
gamification as a building block of more complex behavioral
demand response approaches to perform peak shaving.
Regrettably, online gaming raises numerous privacy con-
cerns about the possibly improper usage of data gathered
from the players. The authors of [17] and [18] show how
information on physical, mental and social characteristics of
the players can be inferred based on collected logs about per-
formed game actions and choices. Reference [19] discusses
ethical, trust and privacy issues emerging in the framework of
a serious game aimed at reducing traffic jams in Luxembourg.
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The relevance of such issues is even more pronounced when
gaming data are combined with data related to electricity,
water or gas consumption, from which sensitive information
about users’ habits and lifestyles can be inferred [20], [21].
To overcome the above mentioned privacy concerns,
we propose a cryptographic framework for an online gam-
ing portal operated by a third-party entity. The envisioned
application scenario is a smart electricity or water grid where
the utility adopts a gamified mechanism to influence the
consumption patterns of the users in order to indirectly shape
their aggregate load (e.g. for peak shaving or load flatten-
ing scopes). In our preliminary work [22], we described
a privacy-friendly gaming framework where players are
grouped in teams and are challenged to maintain the team-
aggregated consumption below a threshold defined by the
utility. Here, we extend the framework to enable team com-
petitions with the aim of achieving the lowest aggregate
consumption. The framework includes:
• a suite of privacy-friendly protocols relying on Shamir
Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme, which enable the
members of a team to compute their overall resource
consumption without communicating individual meter
readings, and to compare it to those of other teams
without learning the exact consumption amounts;
• a verification protocol relying on Pedersen Commit-
ments, which can be run by the utility to detect whether
users have reported false or altered results to the game
platform;
• a secure, persistent storage of authenticated commit-
ments based on the blockchain technology.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II and III briefly overview the related work and some
cryptographic background notions. Section IV introduces the
privacy-friendly gaming framework and details the proposed
cryptographic protocols. Sections VI and VII respectively
evaluate the security and assess the performance of our frame-
work. The final Section concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. SERIOUS GAMES FOR ENERGY AND
WATER MANAGEMENT
Several serious games have recently been designed to address
smart water and electricity grid ecosystems [5], [6], [9], [10],
[23]. Reference et al. [5] illustrates a game platform for smart
grid demand side management. The game aims at regulating
the aggregate energy consumption of the community of play-
ers, who are let free to self-organize as long as they respect
a given set of social rules. It implements both individual and
group challenges, which reward the players that manage to
achieve predefined objectives. The authors point out the pres-
ence of potential privacy leaks due to the collection of energy
meter readings of the users, but no countermeasures to allevi-
ate such issue are discussed. Similarly, Gustafsson et al. [10]
adopt a challenge-based approach in the design of game
aimed at reducing energy consumption in households: users
are grouped in teams and compete to achieve the lowest
team-aggregated electricity usage. A virtual ‘‘community
garden’’ is proposed by the gameplay described by
Rizzoli et al. [9]: each user is responsible of a patch of the
garden and his/her water consumption (measured by thewater
meter installed at the user’s premises) determines how much
water the patch receives: the more water is wasted in the
household, the less is given to plants. The players can interact
and exchange tips on how to reduce their water usage. Users
with the most fluorishing patches are awarded.
Galli et al. [23] propose a more evolved water conservation
framework based on a gamified web portal: through such
portal, the water utility exposes to the users their individ-
ual water consumption in real time. Moreover, a system of
rewards combining points and badges is adopted to acknowl-
edge water-saving behaviors, learning actions (e.g. watching
educational videos offered by the portal), and data provision
actions (e.g. providing detail on the individual consumption
patterns of water consuming appliances, which can be fur-
ther processed by the utility for load forecasting purposes).
An enhanced version of such framework, this time aimed at
energy conservation, is proposed by Fraternali et al. [24]. The
framework integrates two different gamification elements, i.e.
gamified rewards such as points, badges, achievements and
redeemable prizes and a serious game, combining a physical
board-game with a digital app. The employed game mechan-
ics are goal setting (e.g. personal saving goals are rewarded
with bonus points and supermarket vouchers), social com-
parison and social collaboration (e.g. collecting points in
teams for performing energy saving actions, competing with
others).
The framework proposed in this paper incorporates similar
types of challenges (i.e. multiplayer competitions versus an
unmanned challenger or adversary players) and could be
easily incorporated in the two above mentioned frameworks.
However, our proposed solution leverages a privacy-friendly
protocol that allows for the computation of aggregated con-
sumption values without disclosing metering data at single-
household granularity, under the assumption that users are
augmented honest-but-curious adversaries, (i.e. they adhere
to the protocol rules but try to infer additional information
from the exchanged data and may provide bogus inputs).
Therefore, the protocol provides a verification mechanism
aimed at detecting cheating users. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first attempt to include privacy-preserving
mechanisms in a third-party serious game service.
B. PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA COLLECTION
IN SMART GRIDS
Aclosely related research field is privacy-preserving data col-
lection in smart grids. Several aggregation schemes for meter
readings have been recently proposed (a comprehensive sur-
vey can be found in [25]–[27]), mostly relying on multiparty
computation mechanisms (which allow for the collaborative
computation of an aggregation function without disclosing
the individual inputs of the participants) by virtue of the
homomorphic properties of cryptographic schemes such as
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the Shamir Secret Sharing scheme [28] (adopted e.g. in [29])
and the Pallier cryptosystem [30] (adopted e.g. in [31]–[33]).
In this paper, we use the former scheme. However, differently
from [29] and [31], where the share aggregation procedure
was respectively executed by a set of intermediate entities
called ‘‘privacy-preserving nodes’’ or by the communication
gateways of the local residential area and the result of the
aggregation was communicated only to the Utility, in this
paper the aggregation procedure is collaboratively performed
by the users belonging to the same team and the result-
ing team-aggregated consumption is learned by all the team
members. The Utility is in charge of properly choosing the
team size, ensuring that it is sufficiently large to protect the
privacy of the participants. Similarly to [33], we consider
an augmented honest-but-curious player adversarial model,
where users may provide altered metering data as input to the
game protocol with the aim of winning the game. However,
differently from [33], we assume that the players do not
deviate from the protocol rules. Moreover, we do not address
the issue of faulty/malfunctioning meters, as done in [32].
A few set of operations including comparison, event cor-
relation and entropy computation are known to be imple-
mentable with homomorphic schemes [34]. In particular,
comparisons protocols have been applied to encrypted con-
sumption measurements in privacy-friendly load schedul-
ing frameworks aimed at defining the time of use of
deferrable appliances [35] or the recharge periods of electric
vehicles [36]. In our proposed infrastructure, we leverage on
similar protocols to enable groups of players to compare their
respective aggregate consumptions without learning the exact
values achieved by the adversaries.
C. THE BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
The blockchain technology has attracted a lot of interest as a
potential solution to security issues arising in large environ-
ments of non-trusting devices communicating peer-to-peer
with limited or no management. A survey of the efforts is
available in [37]. Andrychowicz et al. [38] discuss a set
of distributed protocols over the bitcoin network, including
commitments. Our paper leverages a network similar to the
bitcoin one for storing the commitments, but does not nec-
essarily deliver bitcoins as prizes. Kosba et al. [39] define a
blockchain security model that makes it possible to formally
prove security of privacy-friendly protocols. In this paper,
we use a similar model for describing the security properties
of the blockchain.
III. BACKGROUND
A. SHAMIR SECRET SHARING
Threshold schemes are cryptographic protocols that enable
the cooperative reconstruction of a secret that was previously
shared among multiple parties. In a (w, t)-threshold scheme,
the secret is split in w parts (the so-called shares), which are
given to the participants and can be recovered if at least t ≤ w
of them collaborate.
The Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme is a threshold
scheme that works as follows. The dealer chooses a prime
number Q greater than w and than all the possible secrets ν,
uniformly chooses t−1 integer coefficients ρ1, ρ2, · · · , ρt−1
in the range [0,Q − 1] and computes the s-th share (with
s ranging from 1 to w) as the pair (xs, ys), where xs are
distinct integer numbers and ys = ν + ρ1xs + ρ2x2s + . . .
+ ρt−1x t−1s mod Q. If t or more shares are made available
by the respective holders, the secret can be reconstructed
by means of the Lagrange interpolation method. SSS is a
perfectly secure scheme [40], i.e. for every secret ν ∈ ZQ
and any subset of shares S : |S| < t it holds that:
P(M = ν|S) = P(M = ν)
where the random variable M indicates the secret chosen by
the dealer.
SSS has homomorphic properties: the share of the sum
of two secrets can be locally obtained by each participant
by summing the corresponding shares of the two addends.
Conversely, the multiplication of two secrets requires a col-
laborative procedure among the share holders, such as the one
described in [41]. Comparison of two secrets can be imple-
mented following the procedure described in [42], which
enables each party to obtain a share of one bit indicating
the comparison result. Both these protocols are secure if the
Adversary can corrupt at most t − 1 parties.
B. PEDERSEN COMMITMENT SCHEME
A commitment scheme is a two-party cryptographic protocol
in which one of the two entities chooses a secret input and
provides to the counterpart a message, called commitment,
which will be used upon disclosure of the secret itself to
verify that it was not changed after the generation of the
commitment.
Pedersen Commitment Scheme (PCS) [43] works as fol-
lows. Let G be a group of prime order in which the Dis-
crete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is hard. Let h1 and h2 be
two distinct random generators of G. The dealer chooses an
input x and a random number r , then sends c = hx1hr2 to the
counterpart. Later, the dealer reveals the pair (x, r) and the
counterpart verifies the commitment.
PCS is computationally binding, meaning that the dealer
must solve a DLP to find a pair (x ′, r ′) 6= (x, r) that yields
the same commitment. The scheme is also unconditionally
hiding, meaning that for any pair (x, c) there is exactly one r
that maps x into c. Thus, the counterpart learns no information
from c about x. In addition, the scheme is homomorphic:
given two input pairs, (x, r) and (x ′, r ′) such that c is a
valid commitment for (x, r) and c′ is a valid commitment for
(x ′, r ′), then cc′ is a valid commitment for (x + x ′, r + r ′).
Note that one way of guaranteeing that h1 and h2 are
generated randomly is using algorithm PickGroup in [44].
With this algorithm, the seed of the Cryptographically Secure
Pseudorandom Generator serves as a proof that the algorithm
was honestly executed.
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C. THE BLOCKCHAIN
A blockchain is a log of small messages batched into times-
tamped blocks, replicated over all the nodes of a network.
All the nodes of the network have a public/private keypair for
signing messages and are identified by a pseudonym, which
may be the public key itself. Each messages is signed by
the sender and broadcast to the neighboring nodes. Invalid
messages are dropped so that only authenticated messages
reach the majority of the nodes.
Periodically, a mining node packages the new messages
and includes them in a timestamped block. Such block is then
broadcast back to the network. All the messages in a block
become persistent and non-repudiable.Which node is respon-
sible for creating a block depends on the kind of network.
In our proposed system, we assume either a private cloud,
in which the mining nodes accept messages by subscribing
nodes, or a pay-per-message scheme in which the messages
carry with them a fee that is collected by the mining node.
IV. THE PRIVACY-FRIENDLY GAMIFICATION
FRAMEWORK
A. SYSTEM MODEL
As depicted in Figure 1, the gamification framework includes
the following entities.
The Utility is an entity that manages a public service such
as water or electricity supply. It keeps a list of subscribers.
It can access the blockchain and has a public pseudonym U .
The Players are utility subscribers that use a public ser-
vice and are equipped with Smart Meters installed at their
premises, which convey consumption data to the utility.
We will refer to the players as p1, . . . , pN , where N is the
number of players and will also use pi as a unique identifier
for the ith player.
The Game Platform is a third party gaming service that
interacts with the players and keeps track of the winning
teams.
The Smart Meter (SM) is a tamperproof device that mea-
sures water (or energy) consumption with a given frequency.
We assume that it has (at least) two output channels. The
first one is used by the metering company to collect measure-
ments. The second one is used by the meter to send real-time
measurements to the customer. This second channel is also
used to write information to the blockchain.
The blockchain model we adopt is a simplification of the
Hawk model [39], with added considerations regarding the
relation between rounds and timestamps. More specifically,
we make the following assumptions:
• The blockchain implements a discrete clock that incre-
ments in rounds.
• The node that mines a block assigns the new round a
timestamp with its local clock. The network makes no
effort to guarantee clock syncronization, but we assume
that the clock offset w.r.t. the wallclock time is small
w.r.t. the round duration.
• Messages sent to the blockchain are public.
FIGURE 1. The proposed gamification framework.
• Messages received by the blockchain are delivered to
all the nodes at the beginning of the following round.
An adversary can reorder messages within the same
round.
• The blockchain guarantees message integrity
and data origin authentication w.r.t. a specific
pseudonym.
• The blockchain assigns to each received message a
unique identifier.
• Users can make up any feasible number of pseudonyms.
Let A be a pseudonym, d be a general string of data, t be
the current timestamp as seen by A. The model relies on the
following primitive:
message(A, t, d)
which stores in the blockchain a public message d from A.
If the sender wants to specify a destination node, it can do so
by including it in the message itself. The message primitive
involves no transfer of money and is suitable for a private
blockchain, but it can be easily extended to include a storage
fee to be collected by the mining nodes.
The message and its timestamp are stored in a block if
they are signed by A and the timestamp t is greater than the
previous block timestamp and the timestamp of the currently
mined node. It is easy to extend this with a tolerance to cope
with propagation delays.
In our framework we assume that the SM of player pi is
identified by the blockchain pseudonym, Ai , which the utility
can match to a physical device and to a subscription. At the
end of each measurement interval t , the meter performs the
following operations:
1) collect the measurement x
2) generate a random number r
3) calculate a Pedersen commitment as c(t) = hx1hr2
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4) give x and r to the customer
5) perform a store operation to the blockchain:
message(Ai, t, c)
B. GENERAL DESCRIPTION AND GAME RULES
Players can take part to two different types of games: team
challenges or team competitions. Challenges involve groups
of users and consist in keeping the team-aggregated con-
sumption below a given threshold T provided by the Utility.
Alternatively, in team competitions multiple teams compete
to achieve the lowest aggregated consumption.
In both cases, players are allowed to select the time period
of the game among a predefined set of options, ranging
from very short (hours) to very long intervals (weeks). After
the expiration of the time period B, the Gaming Platform
computes the challenge/competition results based on the
team-aggregated consumption of the players and awards any
prizes.
More in detail, the games proceed according to the follow-
ing procedure.
1) When a player pi wants to take part in a new game,
it sends a message to the gaming platform G. For the
sake of easiness, we consider a gaming platform pro-
viding a single game type and a single game duration B,
which is long enough to include multiple reporting
periods of the meter and multiple blockchain rounds.
The extension to multiple concurrent game types and
game durations is straightforward.
2) Periodically, G communicates the list of enrolled play-
ers to the Utility, U , which groups them in a set of
teams and communicates to G the lists of teams and
team members, the game start time, t0, and, for each
team,
• in case of a challenge game, the corresponding
threshold to beat;
• in case of a competition game, the list of players in
the adversary team.
3) Once the game starts, the team members calculate
their aggregate consumption at regular time intervals.
To this aim, all the players compute their individual
time-aggregated consumption from the beginning of
the game and communicate them to the other team
members. Then, the players may decide to modify their
future consumption patterns. In case of team competi-
tions, the two competing teams are also allowed to com-
pare their respective team-aggregated consumption.
4) At the end of the game period, all the players of the win-
ning team claim their prize from the gaming platform
and provide cryptographic evidence of their victory.
Specifically, they provide the aggregate consumption
in a way that the utility can use to verify that it is
consistent with the commitments stored by the meters
in the blockchain.
5) If a cheat is detected, the game platform voids the game;
otherwise the gaming platform:
• declares a winner for the challenge game if and
only if the team-aggregated consumption is below
the threshold T ;
• declares the team with the lower consumption as
the winning team for each competition game.
The platform can also record data related to the players’
accesses and game activities and elaborate statistics on
their performance.
Note that the design of our protocol is agnostic w.r.t. the
awardingmechanism (awards may be either monetary or sim-
ply representative).
C. TRUST MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
Our privacy-friendly gaming framework builds upon the
hereby listed assumptions:
1) Communications between the entities taking part to the
protocol are authenticated and confidential.
2) The Utility is honest-but-curious: it never deviates from
the protocol routine, but tries to obtain the value of
individual electricity consumption measurements hav-
ing finer temporal resolution than the typical billing
period (e.g. one month) with the scope of deducing
private details from the players’ energy consumption
patterns.
3) The game platform is also honest-but-curious: it
behaves according to the same adversary model of the
Utility with analogous goals.
4) The players are augmented honest-but-curious entities,
i.e. they obey to the protocol rules but can choose to
provide arbitrary inputs (e.g. they may declare lower
consumption measurements than the actual ones).
5) Multiple players may form collusions with the aim of
learning information about the energy usage of other
players or to dishonestly win the game by providing
false measurements. The cardinality of a set of colluded
users cannot exceed the team size minus 1.
6) The Smart Meters are trusted, tamper-proof devices.
7) The blockchain is considered as a third party that is
trusted for correctness and availability, but not for
privacy.
D. SECURITY PROPERTIES AND GOALS
OF THE PROTOCOL
We express the security properties in terms of Adversary
goals. The protocol is secure if the achievement of such
goals with non-negligible probability implies the capability
of extracting information from an unconditionally secure
encryption scheme or of solving a computationally hard
problem.
P1 G learns any information about the threshold T ,
the aggregate consumption, or the consumption of any
individual player.
P2 U learns any information on the individual consump-
tion of any player during the execution of the game
other than what is implied by the knowledge of the
aggregate consumption of each team.
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P3 Any collusion of the members of a team provide dif-
ferent measurements than the ones measured by their
meter and G considers the outcome of the game as
correct.
P4 Any collusion of a subset of members of a team learns
any information about the individual consumption of
any non-colluded team member.
P5 Any collusion of members of a competing team learns
any information about the team-aggregate measure-
ments of the other team in addition to whether it
is larger or smaller than their own team-aggregated
consumption.
In the next Section, we provide the details of the privacy-
friendly protocol governing the interactions between players,
game platform and utility.
V. THE PRIVACY-FRIENDLY GAME PROTOCOL
A. THE TEAM CHALLENGE PROTOCOL
We now describe the protocol with reference to the challenge
game, in which a single team plays against a threshold.
When initializing the system, the gaming platform chooses
and publishes the following parameters:
• The modulus Q1, for the secret sharing of the con-
sumption measurements and the modulus Q2, for the
secret sharing of the random number used to hide the
measurement in the commitment. We use two different
moduli because themeasurements aremuch smaller than
the random numbers. Since the number of messages in
the share comparison protocol is heavily dependent on
size of the secret, it is important to keep the share size
small.
• A prime number q1 such that the Decisional Diffie-
Hellmann (DDH) problem is hard in Zq1 and a random
primitive root g of Zq1 .
• A subgroup of Zq1 with order q2 in which the Discrete
Logarithm Problem (DLP) is hard and two distinct ran-
dom elements of the subgroup, h1 and h2.
• A Key Generating Function, (KGF), and a semantically
secure symmetric encryption scheme, Enc.
Our proposed privacy-preserving game protocol is divided
in the following phases.
Game Setup: During the initial game setup the following
protocol is executed.
1. Game Selection
Each player i generates a private session key ai and enrolls
with the gaming platform
pi→ G : pi, gai
2. Player List
At regular intervals (e.g. once a day), G forwards to U a
list of the N enrolled players and their public key.
G→ U : (p1, ga1 ) . . . (pN , gaN )
3. Team List
The utility generates a private session key aU and calcu-
lates the session key with each player KiU = KGF((gai )aU ).
The utility forms the teams. Let Lj be the list of the players
that are in team j and Tj be the threshold for team j. For each
team j,
U → G : gaU ,Lj, [Enc(KiU , pi,Tj) ∀ i ∈ Lj]
4. Game Goals
The gaming platform learns the team composition and for-
wards to each player the utility public key and the encrypted
challenge threshold, which remains hidden to the game plat-
form. For each team j and each player i ∈ Lj,
G→ pi : gaU ,Lj,Enc(KiU , pi,Tj)
Computation of the time-aggregate consumption: At the
end of each metering interval, each player calculates the
time-aggregated consumption and divides it in a number of
shares equal to the team size using the SSS scheme with
threshold equal to the team size. Clearly w = size(Lj).
Let α be the number of metering intervals elapsed from
the game start. Each player i collects from the meter the
readings mi(t1), . . .mi(tα), calculates the random polynomial
µi(x) such that µi(0) = ∑αl=1 mi(tl), and evaluates it at x
equal to pos(1), . . . , pos(w), with pos(i) being the position of
player i in the list Lj.
5. Send Share
Each team member communicates to the gaming platform
the shares to be forwarded to the teammates, each one associ-
ated to the identifier of the intended recipient. For each team
j and for each pair (i, k) such that i, k are in the team j,
pi→ G : pk ,Enc(Kik , pi, µi(pos(k)))
6. Forward Share
For each team j and for each pair (i, k) such that i, k are in
the team j,
G→ pk : pi,Enc(Kik , pi, µi(pos(k)))
The metering interval Bmarks the end of the game period.
Thus, in addition to the meter readings, each player also
calculates the sum of the random numbers provided by the
meter ri(t1), . . . ri(tB).
Player i calculates the random polynomials µ(x) and ρ(x)
such that µi(0) = ∑Bl=1 mi(tl) and ρi(0) = ∑Bl=1 ri(tl) and
sends the relevant shares to the other team members.
For each team j and for each pair (i, k) such that i, k are in
the team j,
pi → G : pk ,Enc(Kik , pi, µi(pos(k))
G → pk : pi,Enc(Kik , pi, µi(pos(k)))
Computation of the team-aggregate consumption: For each
team j, each player k of team j calculates the team-aggregate
consumption share pos(k) as: M (pos(k)) = ∑i∈Lj µi(x) and
sends the result to all the other teammates.
For each pair (k, i) of players in the same team,
pk → G : pi,Enc(Kki, pk ,Mj(pos(k)))
G → pi : pk ,Enc(Kki, pk ,Mj(pos(k)))
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Each player i in team j reconstructs the secret polynomial
and calculates the time- and team- aggregated consump-
tion Mj(0). Based on such information, each user can adapt
his/her consumption behavior.
At the end of the game period, a similar subprotocol allows
each player k to calculate the time- and team- aggregated
random number Rj(0).
Verification: At the end of the game period, if Mj(0) < Tj,
then team j wins the challenge.
7. Send Game Outcome
All the players i in a winning team j send a message to
the gaming platform claiming their prize and provide the
time- and team- aggregated consumption and random number
for verifying the truthfulness of their claim. These numbers
are encrypted for the Utility to make them hidden from the
gaming platform.
For each player i in the winning team j,
pi→ G : pi,Enc(KiU ,Mj(0)‖Rj(0))
8. Forward Game Outcome
The platform forwards these messages to the utility for
opening the commitment.
For each player i in the winning team j,
G→ U : pi,Enc(KiU ,Mj(0)‖Rj(0))
9. Final Outcome
For each team j claiming victory, the utility collects from
the blockchain the commitments from all the meters in the
team for all the game period and calculates their product 0j.
By virtue of the homomorphic properties of the Pedersen





If all the players report the same consumption and random
number and the commitment is verified, the utility confirms
the victory. Otherwise it reports a failure.
U → G : verification outcome
B. THE TEAM COMPETITION PROTOCOL
In this Section, we extend the Team Challenge Protocol in
order to implement a one-against-one competition between
two opposing teams selected by the utility to guarantee a fair
match. The extension to a competition among multiple teams
is straightforward.
Game Setup: The game setup is similar to the challenge
protocol, except that the team consumption threshold for team
is replaced by the list of members of the competing teams.
1. Game Selection
For each i,
pi→ G : pi, gai
2. Player List
G→ U : (p1, ga1 ) . . . (pN , gaN )
3. Team List
The utility generates a private session key aU and calcu-
lates the session key with each player KiU = KGF((gai )aU ).
FIGURE 2. Example of the collaborative comparison protocol phases with
two teams of 6 players each.
Moreover, it forms the teams and groups them in opposing
pairs. Let (Lj,Lj′ ) be the lists of members of two opposing
teams. For each team pair (j, j′),
U → G : gaU ,Lj,Lj′
The gaming platform learns the team compositions and
forwards them to each involved player.
4. Game Goals
For each team pair (j, j′) and each player i in Lj or Lj′ ,
G→ pi : gaU ,Lj,Lj′
Computation of the time- and team-aggregated consump-
tion:At the end of each metering interval the players perform
the computation of the time- and team-aggregated consump-
tion exactly as in the Team Challenge Protocol to obtain
the random polynomials Mj(x) (or Mj′ (x)) representing the
respective total consumption.
Comparison of the aggregated consumption: For the sake
of conciseness, we discuss the details of the aggregated con-
sumption comparison phase in the case of two competing
teams of equal size.1 The members of each team are divided
in two subgroups. Let Mj and Nj be the two subgroups
containing the first and the second half of the members of
team j.2 Similarly,Mj′ andNj′ are the two subgroups of team
j′.
As depicted in Figure 2, this subprotocol comprises three
steps.
1This condition is necessary to ensure that the shares of the aggregated
consumption measurements are computed using polynomials of the same
degree.
2If the size of the team is odd, the additional member is in the first group.
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In the first step (see Figure 2(a)), each player i ∈ Mj
communicatesMj(pos(i)) to the corresponding player inMj′ .
Similarly, each player i ∈ Nj′ communicates Mj′ (pos(i)) to
the corresponding player in Nj. At the end of this procedure
half of the shares of each team are known to the other team.
These shares are not sufficient for reconstructing the other
team consumption.
In the second step, the players who received a share from
the opponent team are engaged in the collaborative com-
parison procedure (see Figure 2(b)), whereas the remaining
ones will be informed about the result of the comparison
in the third step. The collaborative comparison is performed
according to the protocol described in [42]. At the end of the
comparison, the players in Mj and in Nj′ learn a bit indi-
cating which team currently has the lower consumption (see
Figure 2(c)).
Then, each player involved in the comparison broadcasts
the result to each other team member. According to the result
of the comparison, the players may revise their future con-
sumption behaviours.
Verification: At the end of the game period, the two
teams calculate their time- and team-aggregated consumption
Mj(0),Mj′ (0) and random numbers Rj(0),Rj′ (0), and either
team j or team j′ wins the challenge.
7. Send Game Outcome
All the players i in the winning team send a message to
the gaming platform claiming their prize and provide the
encrypted time- and team- aggregated consumption and the
random number for verifying the claim.
For each player i in the winning team j (or j′),
pi→ G : Enc(KiU ,Mj(0)‖Rj(0)).
8. Forward Game Outcome
If the players of the losing team do not falsely claim vic-
tory, the gaming platform adjudicates the match. Otherwise,
the gaming platform forwards all the messages to the utility
for opening the commitments.
For each player i in team j,
G→ U : pi,Enc(KiU ,Mj(0)‖Rj(0))
and similarly for team j′.
9. Final Game Outcome
For each team claiming victory, the utility collects from the
blockchain the commitments from all the meters in the team
for all the game period and calculates their product. After
verifying that the provided consumption is consistent with the
commitment, the utility declares the winning team.
U → G : verification outcome
VI. SECURITY ASSESSMENT
The correctness of the protocol is a direct consequence of the
correctness of the homomorphic aggregation and comparison
protocols.
We now show that the security properties enumerated in
Section IV-C are satisfied by the proposed gaming frame-
work. With the only exception of property P5, we provide
proofs for the case of team challenge with a single team (the
extension to multiple teams and to the case of team competi-
tion is straightforward).
We prove properties P1 and P3 in the computational secu-
rity model. Given an experiment with binary parameter b,
theAdversary is any feasible algorithmA that returns a binary
guess b′. The advantage is defined as:
Adv = |Pr{A = 0|b = 0} − Pr{A = 0|b = 1}|
A property is achieved if the Adversary can win the corre-
sponding experiment with a negligible advantage.
We prove properties P2, P4, and P5 in the information-
theoretic model. A property is achieved if the Adversary can
win the corresponding experiment with probability 1/2.
With respect to P1, we prove that, with the proposed
protocol, the game platform G gains information about the
threshold T with negligible probability. The proof can be
easily extended to the aggregate consumption or the con-
sumption of any individual player.
Algorithm 1 Experiment for Property P1
on input b
G chooses two thresholds T0,T1
The team challenge protocol runs using threshold Tb
G outputs a bit b′
G wins if b = b′
Theorem 1 (Property P1): The game platform has negligi-
ble advantage in winning the experiment in Algorithm 1.
Proof: When running the team challenge protocol,
G receives:
• the player identities pi and their public keys gai ;
• the public key of the utility gaU ;
• the list of team members L;
• the encrypted values Enc(KiU , pi,Tb) for each player i;
• other encrypted messages.
We prove by contradiction. Suppose that G has
non-negligible advantage in winning the experiment in
Algorithm 1. The only messages that depend on Tb are
the encrypted values Enc(KiU , pi,Tb). Therefore, G is
able to distinguish message Enc(KiU , pi,T0) from mes-
sage Enc(KiU , pi,T1) with non-negligible probability. But
this contradicts the hypothesis that Enc is semantically
secure.
Algorithm 2 Experiment for Property P2
on input b
U chooses a team and two series of individual consumption
measurements m0i (t) and m
1
i (t) for all players in the team
and for all time intervals 1 ≤ t ≤ B such that their sum is
the same
The team challenge protocol runs using measurements
mbi (t)
U outputs b′
U wins if b = b′
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Theorem 2 (Property P2): The utility U has probability
1/2 of winning the experiment in Algorithm 2.
Proof: The utility U has access to:
• all the meter commitments ci(t) stored in the blockchain;
• the player identities pi and their public key gai ;
• the team-aggregated consumption M (0) and the sum
R(0) of the random numbers generated by the meters
The player identities and the ephemeral public keys are
independent of the choice of the individual consumption
profiles. By construction, the aggregated consumption M (0)
is the same regardless to the value of b, thus providing no
information on the choice of b. The random number Rj(0) is
the sum of several secret random numbers uniformly chosen
in a finite group, independently of the choice of the individual
consumption patterns.





2 . We now prove
that there exists a unique set of random numbers r ′i (t) that can
be used to reveal m1i (t) as if b were equal to 1.









2 (mod q1) (1)
Let α be the unknown discrete logarithm of h2 with respect
to h1. Then,
αr ′i (t) = αri(t)+ m0i (t)− m1i (t) (mod q2) (2)
Since q2 is prime and h1 and h2 are distinct, then
gcd(α, q2) = 1 and Equation (2) has a unique solution.
We also note that set of random numbers r ′i (t) also sums
to R(0). In fact, by multiplying all the instances of Equa-




















By taking the logarithm of both sides, we obtain:
M (0)+ αR(0) = M (0)+ α
∑
i,t
r ′i (t) (mod q2)
Since gcd(α, q2) = 1, this equation has the unique solution∑
i,t
r ′i (t) = R(0). (mod q2)
Since the set of commitments can reveal both sets of mea-
surements, a curious U cannot distinguish between the case
b = 0 and the case b = 1.
Algorithm 3 Experiment for Property P3
A team of players chooses a set of measurements m′i(t)
different from the set of measurements mi(t) collected by







The team challenge protocol runs
U performs the verification algorithm
The team wins if U accepts the measurements as valid
Theorem 3 (Property P3): The team has negligible advan-
tage in winning the experiment in Algorithm 3.
TABLE 1. Assumptions on parameter sizes.
TABLE 2. Message sizes.
Proof: The tamper-proof meter of each player i commits
to the individual measurements by storing Pedersen commit-
ments ci(t) = hmi(t)1 hri(t)2 in the blockchain for every time
interval t in the game period. By construction, the blockchain
guarantees message integrity and authentication. The utility
combines the individual commitments obtaining a commit-
ment 0 =∏i,t ci(t).
In addition,U receives the aggregate consumptionM (0) =∑
i,t m
′
i(t) and the aggregate random number R(0) =∑
i,t r
′
i (t) from the team players.
In order to win, the team needs to provide a pair
(M (0),R(0)) such that 0 = hM (0)1 hR(0)2 .
Since PCS is computationally binding, any attacker has






Algorithm 4 Experiment for Property P4
on input b
A setW of fewer thanw colluding players chooses a player
i, not involved in the collusion, and two alternative series












The team challenge protocol runs with the non colluded
members providing measurements mbi (t).
W outputs b′
W wins if b = b′
Theorem 4 (Property P4): The colluded players have
probability 1/2 of winning the experiment in Algorithm 4.
Proof: When running the team challenge protocol,
W receives:
• The public key of the utility gaU , the list of team mem-
bers Lj and the game threshold Tj.
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TABLE 3. Traffic Volume per Game Session [bits per execution]. For the sake of easiness, computations are done under assumption that |P| is even an
that all teams chose the same game modality (either challenge or competition). In the case of competitions, the set J ′ includes a half of the teams, each
one competing against a team in J \ J ′ .
• All the shares of the individual measurements delivered
to members of the collusion, i.e. µi(pos(k)) ∀k ∈W , for
each time interval.
• All the shares of the secret polynomials M (x) and R(x),
which hide the aggregate team consumption and team
random numbers.
The player identities and the ephemeral public key of the
Utility are independent of the choice of the individual con-
sumption profiles. By construction, the secret polynomials
M (x) and R(x) do not depend on b.
At every aggregation round t , the colluded players obtain
|W| shares of either the secret m0i (t) or the secret m1i (t).
Since the secret sharing scheme is unconditionally secure,
knowledge of up to w− 1 shares provides no information on
the shared secret. It follows that the colluded players gain no
advantage in winning the experiment.
Theorem 5 (Property P5): The players of Team 1 have
probability 1/2 of winning the experiment in Algorithm 5.
Proof: The only messages received by Team 1 that
depend on b are the messages exchanged in step 4 (Game
Goals). The comparison protocol is unconditionally secure
against a collusion of at mostw players. Since the comparison
Algorithm 5 Experiment for Property P5
on input b
The attacker A is the set of players of Team 1.
Team 1 chooses its aggregate consumption M1.
Team 1 chooses two aggregate consumption valuesM02 and
M12 such that M
0
2 < M1 and M
1
2 < M1.
The Team Competition protocol runs with Team 2 provid-
ing Mb2 as input.
Team 1 outputs b′
Team 1 wins is b = b′
protocol is performed by half of the members of Team 1,
it follows thatA controls at most w/2 players. Consequently,
A gains no advantage in the experiment from the knowledge
of the protocol messages.
VII. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
In this Section we evaluate the data throughput and
computational effort required from each entity participat-
ing in our proposed privacy-friendly gaming framework.
To this aim, we make the assumption that a standard
AES symmetric cryptosystem with Counter mode (CTR)
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TABLE 4. List of computational costs.
TABLE 5. Node computational load.
operation and nonces of 128 bits is implemented in the infras-
tructure (i.e. on input of am-bit-long plaintext, the cryptosys-
tem outputs am+n-bits-long cyphertext, where n is the nonce
length). Tables 1 and 2 respectively report the sizes of all the
parameters required by our privacy-friendly protocol and of
every exchanged message.
Additionally, in Table 3 we report the input/output data
volumes that are received/sent by the involved entities in each
protocol phase. Results show that every player sends/receives
data volumes in the order of tenths of megabits, depending on
the number of team members. Differently, the utility and the
game platform exchange a higher amount of data, due to the
quadratic dependency on the size of the teams (e.g. 1000 users
grouped in 50 teams of 20members each lead to data volumes
in the order of hundreds of Gbits). We assume that both
entities run the game application on dedicated servers with
adequate communication capabilities.
Moreover, we report the computational effort required
from each involved entity in Table 5 during every phase of the
protocol. The computational costs of each operation in terms
of multiplications and exponentiations are detailed in Table 4.
Results show that the game platform does not perform any
computation and uniquely acts as a relay node, whereas the
utility is required to perform computations during for the
game setup and results verification phases. The computa-
tional burden in terms of number of exponentiations shows
a linear dependency on the total number of players, whereas
the number of multiplications grows logarithmically with the
team sizes. However, both phases occur only once during
a single game execution and the temporal horizon of each
game may span one or several days. Therefore, the protocol
guarantees scalability even when several thousands of users
are involved (e.g. the citizens of a medium/large-sized town).
Finally, at the player side, the highest computational burden
is required for the consumption aggregation and comparison.
Their computational complexity mainly depends on the num-
ber of collaborative multiplications, which grows linearly
with the number of team members. However, if the number
of players per team is in the order of tens of users and
under the reasonable assumption that the SSS modulus is
relatively small, a few thousands of modular multiplications
are expected to be computed at every comparison round (i.e. a
few times per each game execution). Therefore, as long as the
team size is limited, the framework scalability is not hindered.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we propose a privacy-friendly gaming platform
aimed at engaging users in diminishing the energy/water
consumption at their premises. The game implements team
challenges against an unmanned adversary or among com-
peting player teams. We also propose a protocol that enables
the game execution without disclosing the individual meter
readings of the participants.
To detect cheating, the protocol uses a blockchain-based
authenticated storage to collect secure commitments by
the meters. This way, the users can formally prove to
have correctly reported their measurements to the protocol
without disclosing the measurements themselves. We assess
the security of the proposed framework assuming that
the entities behave according to the honest-but-curious
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adversarial model. The numerical assessment of the compu-
tational load and exchanged data volumes required by the
protocol shows that the framework can scale up to several
thousands of players.
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